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Meeting the Dalai Lama and Perceptions of Democracy in China: A 
Quasi-Natural Experiment 
ABSTRACT 
How does the international human rights community affect the likelihood of 
GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ" 6FKRODUVKLS RQ &KLQHVH FLWL]HQV· SUHIHUHQFHV DERXW WKHLU SROLWLFDO
system has not explored the importance of the external environment, perhaps 
surprising given the H[WHQVLYHIRUHLJQSUHVVXUHRQ&KLQD·VDXWKRULWDULDQV\VWHPRYHUWKH
last thirty years. I use a quasi-natural experiment around the meeting between President 
Obama and the Dalai Lama in 2011 to examine the impact of foreign pressure on 
FLWL]HQV· perceptions of democracy in China in real time. I show that the meeting 
VLJQLILFDQWO\LQFUHDVHVWKH&KLQHVHSXEOLF·VEHOLHIWKDWWKHLUFRXQWU\LVGHPRFUDWLF, with 
those of above average patriotism over eleven percentage points more likely to believe 
China is democratic in the five days following the meeting than before. The findings 
suggest that some kinds of external pressure may help to increase satisfaction with 
authoritarian ruleXOWLPDWHO\ERRVWLQJDXWRFUDWV·DELOLW\WRKROGRQWRSRZHU 
 
Democratization is implausible if citizens do not desire political change. To understand whether 
a country is likely to move towards a more democratic system we need to know the extent to 
which the people want more democracy - whether they value democratic rights, but also whether 
they think they need to be improved in their country. While studies have shown that support for 
democratic values is strong in China1, the majority of Chinese citizens also believe that their 
country is already democratic2. 
 2 
 
Scholars have attributed these beliefs to factors from political culture and propaganda 3  to 
economic conditions and government responsiveness4. Given the huge external pressure on 
China since 1989 - pressure with the explicit purpose of shaping a more free and democratic 
China5 - one factor notably absent is the impact of the international world. Information about 
this external pressure has been widely available for Chinese citizens ² the state-run 3HRSOH·V'DLO\ 
reported over two hundred separate incidents of human rights pressure on to the public between 
1989 and 2011 6 . How these efforts affect public beliefs about their political system is an 
important missing element in understanding the prospects for democratization.  
 
In this article I examine the impact of one such effort - world leaders·PHHWLQJs with the Dalai 
Lama - on Chinese perceptions of the level of democracy in their country. These meetings are 
regularly framed as pressure on the Chinese government over human rights in Tibet. I take 
advantage of a unique opportunity that arises from a highly publicized meeting between 
President Obama and the Dalai Lama at the time of a nationwide Asian Barometer survey in China 
in 2011. The meeting significantly incrHDVHVWKHSXEOLF·VEHOLHIWKDW WKHLUFRXQWU\ LVGHPRFUDWLF, 
an effect driven by national pride, with those of above average patriotism 11.6 percentage points 
more likely to believe China is democratic in the five days following the meeting. These findings 
support the argument that pressure from abroad may evoke a defensive response in members of 
the public, strengthening their positive perceptions of their system of government. The meeting 






Perceptions of democracy  
 
Studies of democratization in China find that support for democracy is strong in the country7, 
leading authors like Zhengxu Wang to say WKDW´PRUHDQGPRUHSHRSOHDUHJURZLQJXSZLWKWKH
belief that political rights and freedom supersede economic wellbeing or other materialist 
JRDOV«We can be cautiously optimistic about the prospecWVIRUGHPRFUDWLFFKDQJH LQ&KLQDµ8 
On the other hand, the lack of enthusiasm for democratization amongst the Chinese public in 
recent years has led some to cast doubt on this optimism9, and other scholars have shown that 
support for democracy amongst the Chinese middle classes is not developing as quickly as 
expected10.  
These debates obscure the fact that support for democracy is not enough to encourage popular 
mobilization11. Crucially, to agitate for political change citizens need to both value a political 
V\VWHPDQGEHOLHYH WKDW WKH V\VWHPGRHVQRWDSSO\ LQ WKHLUFRXQWU\7KHSHUFHSWLRQ WKDWRQH·V
country is undemocratic is essential to push for a more democratic system in the future. And 
opinion polls suggest that while support for democracy may be high, most Chinese citizens 
believe that their system is already democratic 12 , despite most international organizations 
continuing to designate it as a one-party authoritarian regime13.  
According to Dickson, this is because &KLQHVHSHRSOH VHH ¶GHPRFUDF\· QRW MXVW DV DPHDQVE\
which leaders are chosen, but how well the political system reflects the needs of the public14. Lu 
and Shi find that Chinese citizens generally conceive of democracy as ¶WDNLQJWKHPDMRULW\·VYLHZ
into FRQVLGHUDWLRQ· rather WKDQ ¶PDMRULW\ UXOH WKURXJK SRSXODU YRWH· 7KH\ DUJXH WKDW WKH
JRYHUQPHQW·V propagation of this concept through media and education has been the major 
factor in making Chinese citizens believe that their country is democratically ruled15.  
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However, whether citizens see democracy as rule by the people16, or on behalf of the people17, 
the puzzle remains. What makes Chinese citizens satisfied with how their country is run, and 
unwilling to call for reforms? This question has attracted extensive scholarly attention. One view 
is that economic growth is responsible18, while Nathan argues that the V\VWHP·Vresilience comes 
from public participation in decision-making 19 . Others have found that in areas from the 
National 3HRSOH·V&RQJUHVV20 to social welfare21, the CCP has shown responsiveness to citizen 
demands (with the assumption that this responsiveness increases public satisfaction with their 
system22).  
A neglected part of the literature is the impact international actions have on SHRSOH·VEHOLHIWKDW
their government is acting democratically. How WKUHH GHFDGHV RI SUHVVXUH RQ &KLQD·V KXPDQ
rights and political system have affected the beliefs of Chinese citizens about their domestic 
circumstances remains a mystery. This is not just limited to China: as Hyde and Lamb argue, the 
democracy promotion literature in general does a poor job of addressing how external actions 
affect attitudes towards democracy23. As a result, in recent years, this question has begun to 
receive growing attention from political scientists, and recent studies have found that exposure 
to NGO naming and shaming24 and international law25 can LQFUHDVHFLWL]HQV·VXSSRUWIRUKXPDQ
rights.  
The influence of international actions on perceptions of human rights conditions is less 
conclusive however. Davis and colleagues, and Ausderan show that naming and shaming 
campaigns make citizens less likely to believe their government respects human rights.26 These 
studies provide only an aggregate effect however, and the paucity of observations means that the 
positive impact may be limited to liberal democracies. Scholars have begun to use experiments to 
EUHDN GRZQ WKLV DJJUHJDWH HIIHFW LQ OHVV GHPRFUDWLF VWDWHV ILQGLQJ WKDW FLWL]HQV· reaction to 
foreign comments may depend on their political identities RU ¶SDUWLVDQ FXHV·. Bush and Jamal 
show that in Jordan, only regime supporters responded positively to US endorsements of 
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government policies27, while Marinov finds that foreign condemnation of political freedoms in 
Turkey had positive effects on citizens· SHUFHSWLRQV only when it was supported by political 
leaders28. 
These analyses may be less relevant for places like China, one-party states where political 
identities are less clearly defined. As Pan and Xu argue, the spectrum of ideologies in China 
"does not delineate a cleavage between those who support regime policies and those who 
oppose them"29. Perhaps more importantly, experimental studies do not capture how citizens 
respond in real life to foreign pressure. In authoritarian states, information will be heavily 
censored and reach the public through a mass of propaganda and other news. Does news of the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\·VDFWLRQVHYHQUHDFKSHRSOH",IVRFDQZHH[WHQGSHRSOH·V immediate 
responses to a manipulated prompt to their real-time responses?  
 
President Obama and the Dalai Lama 
 
To test this, I take advantage of the meeting between President Obama and the Dalai Lama on 
17 July 2011, as a quasi-natural experiment. At this time the Asian Barometer Survey was in the 
middle of administering its nationwide survey. 3197 of the 3473 total interviews took place in 
July. As the meeting was announced only late on the previous day, and fell in the middle of the 
survey, this provides a perfect opportunity to examine how it affected views of democracy in 
China. To minimise the influence of other events, I examine responses in the five days before 
and the five days after the meeting (1525 respondents).  
The survey was carried out face-to-face on a randomized selection of adults to reflect national 
probability samples, weighted to ensure coverage of minority and rural populations in all 
provinces of mainland China except Tibet, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang30. Since the 
survey is randomly assigned, these respondents should primarily differ in their exposure to the 
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news that passed through on 17 July (I control for other demographic differences). The control 
group are those not yet aware of the meeting, while the treatment group are those able to hear 
about the meeting. 
While the White House has been at pains to say that official meetings are LQ WKH'DODL/DPD·V
capacity as a religious leader, foreign leader assemblies with activists are a common part of 
democracy promotion. In 2007 President Bush called official meetings with dissidents a central 
SLOODU RI WKH $PHULFDQ ´FRPPLWPHQW WR SURPRWH GHPRFUDF\ ZRUOGZLGHµ 31 , and presidential 
gatherings with Soviet dissidents were publicized as part of American efforts to engender 
political liberalization 32  $V IRUPHU GLVVLGHQW 1DWDQ 6KDUDQVN\ VDLG WKHVH PHHWLQJV ´had a 
tremendous influence on our movemenWRQSHRSOHDURXQGXVDQGRQWKHDXWKRULWLHVµ33. 
Meetings with the Dalai Lama have followed a similar script. The White House statement 
IROORZLQJWKHPHHWLQJVWDWHG2EDPD·V´VWURQJVXSSRUWIRU«the protection of human rights 
IRU7LEHWDQV LQ WKH3HRSOH·V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDµ34. The Chinese media has explicitly portrayed 
the meetings as human rights criticism35. As such, they allow us to examine how a common piece 
RI SUHVVXUH RQ &KLQD·V GRPHVWLF SROLWLFV IURP WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\ DIIHFWV &KLQHVH
FLWL]HQV·SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHLUSROLWLFDOV\VWHP 
The Dalai Lama took part in an 11-day Buddhist ritual in Washington, D.C. in July 2011. 
President Obama had stayed cool over a potential meeting, but on Saturday morning Chinese-
time (the 16th), the White House announced they would meet the following day. The two had a 
private discussion around 11.30pm Saturday night Chinese-time, a White House statement saying 
that Obama ´underscored the importance of the protection of human rights of Tibetans in 
&KLQDµ36, while the Dalai Lama said that Obama expressed his ´JHQXLQHFRQFHUQDERXWVXIIHULQJ
LQ7LEHWµ37. These comments hit the international press the following day38. 
The Chinese government only had time to issue one diplomatic warning on the 16th39, a warning 
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repeated in the Global Times40. The meeting was, however, discussed heavily in state media on the 
Sunday: a 3HRSOH·V 'DLO\ editorial denounced the gathering and US criticism of political and 
religious freedoms in Tibet (they ´FDOOWKHKXPDQUights situation LQ7LEHW¶HYLO·µ41), while a series 
of articles in the Global Times over 17 and 18 July noted that Obama had met the Dalai over his 
´FRQFHUQIRUKXPDQULJKWVLQ7LEHWµDQGWKH3UHVLGHQW·V FDOOIRU´DWWHQWLRQWRWKHKXPDQULJKWV
VLWXDWLRQLQ7LEHWµ42.  
The last-minute announcement of the meeting meant that Chinese citizens had little prior 
knowledge that it might RFFXU 7UHQGV RI *RRJOH VHDUFKHV VKRZ IHZ VHDUFKHV IRU WKH ¶'DODL
/DPD·XQWLO July, with interest peaking between the 17th and 19th. While we can only read so 
much into this trend, since Google is banned in China, it does demonstrate that even for citizens 
willing to breach the internet firewall, there was no awareness of the meeting before 16 July, and 
that interest was high (18 July saw just under twice as many searches for the Dalai as for Hu 
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Impact of the meeting 
 
How do world leader meetings with the Dalai Lama affect whether Chinese citizens hold 




Perceptions of democracy 
 
The meeting highlights not just the political and civil rights essential to a western conception of 












Hu Jintao Dalai Lama
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¶JXDUGLDQVKLS·FRQFHSWLRQRIGHPRFUDF\The literature predicts that hearing this kind of human 
rights pressure should reduce how well people believe that their rights are respected44. A negative 
DVVHVVPHQW RI WKHLU FRXQWU\·V UHVSHFW IRU LWV FLWL]HQV· ULJKWV VKRXOG PDNH WKHP OHVV OLNHO\ WR
believe that their country is democratic.  
 
I argue in contrast that human rights pressure may increase popular satisfaction with the target 
JRYHUQPHQW·VSROLWLFDOV\VWHP² at least in one-party states like China.  
 
A tenet of social identity theory is that people wish to maintain a positive image of their social 
group, and defend that image against anything that might threaten it45. If this social group is the 
QDWLRQWKHQWKHWKUHDWPLJKWLQFOXGHLQIRUPDWLRQWKDWVXJJHVWVWKHFRXQWU\·VSROLWLFDOV\VWHPRU
human rights are not good enough. Meetings with the Dalai Lama, if perceived as an attempt to 
attack China or bring down its status in the international community, will do precisely this, 
GLUHFWO\FKDOOHQJLQJWKHQDWLRQ·VVWDWXVDQGLWVFLWL]HQV·VHOI-esteem. 
 
Since the CCP controls the propaganda apparatus, it is able to portray meetings in the way that 
ZLOOPDNHWKHPPRVWWKUHDWHQLQJWRWKHQDWLRQ·VVWDWXV² a deliberate and hostile attack from the 
West. In 2011, the 3HRSOH·V'DLO\ UHLWHUDWHG WKDW ´:HVWHUQ DQWL-&KLQD IRUFHVµ46 were using the 
'DODL /DPD DV D SROLWLFDO WRRO LQ RUGHU WR ´HPEDUUDVVµ 47 &KLQD DQG FKDOOHQJH LWV ´WHUULWRULDO
LQWHJULW\µ48. In interviews with thirty-one Chinese students in the US after the 2016 meeting, a 
common interpretation was that the meeting was a deliberate political attack on China.  
 
In the face of this kind of threat to their self-esteem, people will do what they can to maintain 
the positive image of their nation 49 . This might include rejecting or counterarguing the 
threatening information50, or derogating its source512QHZD\WRPDLQWDLQWKHQDWLRQ·VVWDWXVLV
to find other ways to bolster the status of the group. Branscombe and colleagues show that when 
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people (who feel valued by their in-group) feel disrespected by another group, they will take 
VWHSV WR LPSURYH WKHLU JURXS·V LPDJH52. Others have found that if people actively affirm the 
positive aspects of their group, they effectively reduce the threat felt in response to critical 
information, particularly if they identify strongly with the group53. This means that if people feel 
D WKUHDW WR WKHLUQDWLRQ·V VWDQGLQJ IURPKXPDQULJKWVSUHVVXUH WKHQE\H[SUHVVLQJ WKHZD\V LQ
which the nation is good, they should be able to offset the cost to their self-esteem. This 
suggests that if people do feel that meetings with the Dalai Lama are an attempt to attack China, 
its political system and its international standing, then they may deliberately bolster their positive 
views about their country and its political system, making them more likely to believe that their 
country is democratic. 
 
This is similar to the concept of a rally effect, whereby threats like terrorist attacks may increase 
public trust in political institutions54. Since the CCP portrays the Dalai Lama as seeking the 
breakup of China, a meeting may heighten the salience of this existential threat, potentially 
making people more positive about their political system.  
 
I test this alternative in two ways. Firstly, scholars have shown that existential threats lead to 
greater support for authoritarian values55. If there is a rally effect, then support for democracy 
should go down, in contrast to hypothesis 2. Secondly, the rally effect should increase patriotic 
sentiment56. In contrast, if people are defensively EROVWHULQJ WKHLU QDWLRQ·V LPDJH LW VKRXOG EH
those who are already strongly identified with their nation who see the largest increase in 
perceptions of democracy57. Those for whom the status of their nation is most important to their 
self-esteem will be those who feel the threat to that status most closely, and will be those most 
willing to bolster it. This gives my primary hypothesis: 
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H1: World leader meetings with the Dalai Lama will make Chinese people believe their country 
is more democratic, especially if they have a strong attachment to their nation. 
 
Support for democracy 
 
If this argument holds, then we might also expect human rights pressure on China to reduce 
support for democratic values. Chinese anger at the meeting may translate into anger at US 
efforts to promote human rights and democracy, and in turn the very idea of democracy. 
 
However, it is feasible that negative views about the US and its democracy promotion may not 
extend to views about democracy itself. Chinese citizens may instead view the US as less 
democratic for meeting with the Dalai Lama against the wishes of the Chinese people. Moreover, 
I argue that defensiveness to foreign pressure should make patriotic Chinese citizens more likely 
to affirm positive aspects of their country, in particular its level of democracy. This argument 
would not hold if those Chinese citizens did not believe that democratic rule is a positive thing 
IRUWKHLUFRXQWU\7RIHHOJRRGDERXWEHOLHYLQJWKDWRQH·VFRXQWry is democratic, one also needs 
WR EHOLHYH WKDW GHPRFUDF\ LV D JRRG WKLQJ IRU RQH·V FRXQWU\ 6R LI &KLQHVH FLWL]HQV DUH WDNLQJ
steps to affirm how democratic China is in order to make them feel better about their country, 
then it makes little sense for them to, in the same breath, also denigrate the importance of 
democracy. Some may even end up supporting it more. 
 
H2: World leader meetings with the Dalai Lama will have little effect on how much Chinese 
citizens value democracy in their country. 
 
Together, the two hypotheses imply that after hearing about the meeting, Chinese citizens 
should be more satisfied with the state of democracy in their country, and should therefore hold 
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IHZHUJULHYDQFHVZLWKWKHLUSROLWLFDOV\VWHP%\¶JULHYDQFHV·,UHIHUWRWKRVH citizens who actively 
support the concept of democracy, but do not believe that their country currently is a democracy. 
¶*ULHYDQFHV·DUHWKHUHDOIRFXVRIWKHDXWKRULWDULDQUHVLOLHQFHOLWHUDWXUHZKHWKHU&KLQHVHFLWL]HQV
are content that their country upholds the values they believe are important. While I split this 
concept into perceptions and support for democracy to examine the mechanisms of 
international pressure, I also explore directly the subset of people who support democracy but 
believe China is undemocratic. 
 
This means that the CCP can use the meetings for its own purposes. And since 2008, foreign 
meetings have been trumpeted widely to the Chinese public, as shown in figure 2, arguably due 
to the public reaction following the 2008 Tibet riots. Following international criticism of the 
&&3·VUHVSRQVH&KLQHVHQHWL]HQVEHJDQDQRQOLQHFDPSDLJQDJDLQVWIRUHLJQ ¶EXOO\LQJ·EXLOGLQJ
to mass protests against Carrefour and CNN58. State media seized on the opportunity to tie the 
Dalai Lama into this reaction59, and when Nicolas Sarkozy met the Dalai in December, there 




Figure 2: Proportion of Dalai Lama meetings with foreign heads of state reported in People's Daily, 1989- 





My main dependent variable is the response to a scale from 1 (completely undemocratic) - 10 
FRPSOHWHO\ GHPRFUDWLF WKDW DVNV ´ZKHUH ZRXOG \RX SODFH &KLQD WRGD\ RQ WKLV VFDOHµ 7KLV
question addresses the extent to which Chinese people believe that their country is democratic. 
There are no questions directly about national attachment, with the closest measure about 
national pride, which I interact with the meeting. For hypothesis 2, I examine whether people 
choose ´GHPRFUDF\ LV DOZD\V SUHIHUDEOH WR DQ\ RWKHU NLQG RI JRYHUQPHQWµ RU ´under some 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVDQDXWKRULWDULDQJRYHUQPHQWFDQEHSUHIHUDEOHWRDGHPRFUDWLFRQHµFRGLQJ¶·if 
they chose democracy as DOZD\VSUHIHUDEOHDQG ¶·otherwise.  A higher response indicates an 
increase in support for democracy. ,W LV ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW ¶SHUFHSWLRQV RI GHPRFUDF\· DQG
¶VXSSRUWIRUGHPRFUDF\·DUHPHDVXUHGLQGLIIHUHQWZD\VDFURVVGLIIHUHQWVWXGLHV61. For this study I 










I use the following estimation strategy, using ordered logits for perceptions and logistic 
regressions for support, as well as OLS models for ease of interpretation:  
 
Perception/Support of Democracy = Į + ȕ1Meeting + ȕ2National Pride+ ȕ3Pride*Meeting + ȕ4Individual level 
controls + ȕ4Provincial Fixed Effects/ȕ4Provincial level controls+ İt  
7KH YDULDEOH ¶0HHWLQJ· indicates whether the respondent was interviewed on or after 17 July. 
There are some significant differences between demographic variables in the control and 
treatment group (see appendix). I employ individual and group-level controls, including gender, 
age, education, interest in news about politics and foreign issues, a dummy for Buddhism, and 
ZKHWKHUWKHUHVSRQGHQW·VORFDWLRQLVXUEDQRUUXUDO62.  
DLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ WKH WZR JURXSV LQ UHVSRQGHQWV· LQWHUHVW LQ SROLWLFV DQG IRUHLJQ QHZV LQ
particular may correspond to differences in their knowledge about the Chinese political system. 
In addition to controls, I address this concern with entropy balancing to match covariates across 
pre- and post-meeting groups63. To check further that the differences in interest in politics or 
foreign news between groups does not have a significant influence on knowledge about 
democracy in China, I analyse two placebo questions: on the levels of democracy in Japan and 
India. If differences in political knowledge between groups H[SODLQUHVSRQGHQWV·GLYHUJLQJYLHZV
about democracy in China, then we should also see significant differences in responses to these 
questions, which require some general knowledge about politics and foreign news. No such 
differences exist64.  
Finally, since differences may come from the possibility that the survey was carried out at 
different times in different settings, especially from differences between richer and poorer 
provinces, I control for provincial Purchasing Power Parity in mid-2011. I also control for 
whether the province contains a Tibetan minority of over 1%, as well as using provincial fixed 
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effects. The meeting was reported on a Sunday, so both groups contain one weekend-day and 
four weekdays.  
Results 
Perceptions of democracy 
The meeting between President Obama and the Dalai Lama made Chinese citizens significantly 
more likely to see their country as democratic. In the five days following the meeting, the belief 
that China was a democracy increased by 0.565 on a 1-10 scale, significant at p<0.01 (table 1:2). 
This effect was markedly larger for more patriotic citizens, with every increase in national pride 
on the 1-4 scale increasing the belief that China is a democracy by 0.418 (p<0.05) (table 1:4). 
This translates into a 11.6 percentage point increase in those who believe China is democratic in 
some form. 7KHUHVXOWVDOVRKROGIRUDQDOWHUQDWHPHDVXUHRISHUFHSWLRQVRIGHPRFUDF\¶XQGHU
WKHFXUUHQWV\VWHP·65. 
7KHPHHWLQJDOVRVWUHQJWKHQVSHRSOH·VSRVLWLYHRXWORRNDERXWWKHFRXQWUy as a whole, including 
the belief that people have basic necessities66 and freedom of speech67, that corruption is not 
widespread 68 , and that the economy is doing well 69 . All have positive but non-significant 








Table 1:Impact of Dalai Lama meeting on support for democracy and perceptions of democracy 
 Perceptions: 
DL meeting only 
Perceptions: 
Interaction of meeting and 
national pride 
Support:  










































































































































































   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   






       
N 1,212 1,212 1,207 1,207 967 967 
R-squared  0.070  0.095  0.033 
Number of 
provinces 
 21  21  20 
       
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1 
 17 
Support for democracy 
The meeting between Obama and the Dalai Lama makes citizens value democracy more. In the 
five days following the meeting, survey respondents were significantly more likely to believe 
democracy is preferable to other forms of government (table 1:6), and also significantly more 
likely to want democracy in the future70. The meeting increases the proportion of the population 
who see democracy as always preferable from 81.3% to 88.7%.  
Grievances 
For there to be a popular will to reform the system of government, citizens need to both want 
democracy, and believe that their country is not democratic. And when we analyze the subgroup 
of people who do prefer a democracy, we find that the percentage who believe China is 
undemocratic (below 5 on the scale) drops by almost half, from 9.83% to 4.95%71. The meeting 
also makes Chinese citizens significantly more likely to believe that their political system deserves 
their support72 DQGLVFDSDEOHRIVROYLQJWKHFRXQWU\·VSUREOHPV73; and makes them significantly 
more satisfied with the level of democracy in their country74. 
 
Table 2: Predicted Probabilities of perceived democracy on 1-10 scale, using OLS, fixed effects 
































Observations 1212 769 443 
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Figure 3: Probability respondents believe China is democratic (5 or above on a 1-10 scale), in five days before and 




My argument implies that changes in perceptions and support for democracy may be part of the 
same process. Error terms in regression equations may therefore be correlated, and so I also test 
the two through seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). The SUR model yields similar results to 
independent estimations75. Secondly, as mentioned above, important characteristics such as age 
and political interest are unevenly distributed across control and treatment. As well as controlling 
for these characteristics, I use entropy balancing weights to balance them across groups76. As 
shown in the appendix, after balancing, the difference between the pre- and post-meeting groups 
on the relevant covariates (including political interest) is zero. Estimation following this 
balancing does not substantially change the main results77. 
While the meeting was not fully reported until 17 July, some would have heard about the 
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announcement on the 16th. Using 16 July as a cut-off leads to, if anything, a stronger impact on 
perceptions of democracy78. These results also hold over longer periods. In ten and fifteen days 
either side of the meeting, positive impacts on perceptions and support for democracy both 
remain significant79. The interaction with national pride weakens80.  
Is the effect on perceptions only limited to those who see democracy as ¶JXDUGLDQVKLS·? The 
survey asks people what they feel are the most essential features of democracy, and while the 
meeting does increase perceptions of democracy amongst the third who see it primarily for 
narrowing income inequality81, it has stronger effects amongst the (richer, more urban) third who 
believe it is about whether the people can choose their leaders82. There are also significant effects 
on those who see democracy as the legislature controlling the government 83 , and as courts 
protecting people against government abuses84. 
While the meeting was the main story in Chinese media on 17 July, other news did not stop, 
notably a major train crash in Wenzhou on 23 July, that may have affected longer timeframes, 
and bomb-and-knife attacks in Hotan on 18 July. These attacks may have also served as a threat 
WR WKH QDWLRQ·V LPDJH ZKLFK XUJHV FDXWLRQ RQ P\ ILQGLQJV 7KH DWWDFNV GLG QRW reach the 
newspapers until 19 July however85. Official discussions in newspapers and news websites did not 
come out until 20 and 21 July86. To show that the critical incident was the meeting, I conduct 31 
separate regressions for perceptions of democracy where the treatment cut-off is a different date 
in July (15 days either side), for those with above average national pride. If the meeting is most 
important there should be a peak around 17 July. Figure 4 shows that as expected, 17 July is a 
critical point, with the only highly significant difference (p<0.01) from zero coming when the 
treatment is on that day.  
 
The graph suggests that the Hotan attacks were less important than the Dalai Lama meeting, 
with positive perceptions of democracy peaking before the incident. Indeed, controlling for 
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treatments on the 17th and the 19th, the meeting remains significant, while the attacks have a non-
significant negative effect 87 . The same holds for support for democracy 88 . Given previous 
evidence of terrorist attacks engendering more authoritarian attitudes89, increased support for 
democratic values over this period suggests that the attack had little effect on public attitudes. 
 
Figure 4: Coefficients for OLS regression (FE) 15 days either side of date in July: for whether China is democratic or 
not (for those above average national pride). Black dots are statistically significant increases (p<0.1 for small and 
p<0.01 for large).  
  
 
Are people more concerned about giving negative evaluations of the regime after the Dalai Lama 
meeting? Using a similar design, Jiang and Yang find that a 2006 purge in Shanghai made 
residents more likely to overtly support the government ² something they put down to 
preference falsification90 . It is conceivable that the meeting increases FLWL]HQV· awareness of 
freedom of speech, and therefore makes them more likely to falsify their political beliefs. In the 
survey, respondents can choose not to give a definitive answer - something we might expect 










































































differences between the control and treatment groups in use of these options however 91 . 
Respondents are also no less likely to admit that they have previously been involved in collective 
action after the meeting 92  ² behaviour that is arguably even more sensitive than providing 
negative regime evaluations93. 
 
On the other hand, state media reports of the 2011 meeting were accompanied by glowing 
portrayals of the prosperity of Tibet94, which (rather than the meeting itself) may have pushed 
people to feel more positively about their political system. The barrage of propaganda might also 
make citizens more likely to feel the need to match the media voices and ¶cheerlead· to the 
interviewer positive views about their country; views that they might not actually believe95. While 
both accounts are SODXVLEOHWKH¶SRVLWLYH·SURSDJDQGDZDVQRWXQLTXHWRWKH'DODL/DPDPHHWLQJ
and indeed pales in comparison to other times in the month. As an example taken at random, on 
9 July, front-page 3HRSOH·V'DLO\ stories LQFOXGHGSUDLVHIRU&KLQD·VPLOLWDU\SURJUHVV96, and news of 
excellent GDP growth97. Yet as figure 4 shows, this positive propaganda had little effect on 
perceptions of democracy.  
 
It is conceivable that there was something special about the propaganda around the Dalai Lama 
meeting that made people more likely to cheerlead for their political system at this time, rather 
than actually come to believe that the system is better. There is no convincing theoretical 
explanation for why this would be so after the meeting but not at other times, and especially 
hard to explain why they would be more likely to say they support democracy. However, a 
recurring issue with this kind of survey is that it is hard to distinguish UHVSRQGHQWV·WUXHEHOLHIV 
and their efforts to persuade the interviewer. Future use of endorsement or list experiments, or 




The Domestic Dalai Lama Effect 
 
This study provides the first evidence to show how, in real time, international human rights 
SUHVVXUHDIIHFWVFLWL]HQV·beliefs about their political system. I find that meetings between the US 
President and the Dalai Lama make the Chinese public significantly more likely to believe their 
country is democratically run. This conclusion is complicated by the fact that Chinese citizens 
have a variety of conceptions of what democracy is. The meeting made some believe that their 
government was doing a better job in responding to and looking after its people, and others 
more likely to believe that the CCP submits to checks and balances. At a minimum, however 
they viHZ GHPRFUDF\ KHDULQJ DERXW WKH KXPDQ ULJKWV FRPPXQLW\·V SUHVVXUH RQ WKHLU FRXQWU\
appears to make the Chinese public more satisfied with the way that their government interacts 
with its citizens.  
 
The results fit a theory that Chinese citizens affirm that their nation is democratically governed 
in order to protect their collective self-esteem. However, using the measures provided by the 
Asian Barometer, it is hard to prove that defensiveness is the primary mechanism. Future 
experimental work would help to demonstrate that this is indeed the case. In experimental 
studies, scholars can use response timings to show that when engaging in motivated reasoning, 
respondents take longer to respond to survey questions99. Using survey items that compare the 
defensiveness argument to plausible alternatives would also help directly test the mechanisms 
involved.  
 
Yet even in the absence of these measures, other observable implications do receive substantial 
support. The effect of the meeting on perceptions of dHPRFUDF\LVRQO\GHSHQGHQWRQSHRSOH·V
existing level of national pride, with no other significant interaction effects. This indicates that 
SHRSOH·VDWWDFKPHQWWRWKHLUQDWLRQLVWKHNH\YDULDEOHSURYLGLQJVXSSRUWIRUWKHWKHRU\WKDWWKH
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meetings pose a threat to the status of the nation. The effect of the meeting on perceptions is 
QRWGHSHQGHQWRQSHRSOH·VFRQILGHQFHLQWKHFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW, suggesting people are not cued 
by partisan political identities100. The meeting effect is also only slightly stronger for those with 
greater interest in foreign news, perhaps surprisingly, since these should be the people more 
likely to read about news of the meeting101. However, we cannot read too much into this finding, 
since it may be that those with interests in foreign affairs have other characteristics that make 
them more open to foreign criticism. Moreover, interest in foreign news alone does not 
necessarily cover the extent of SHRSOH·Vability or willingness to find out about the Dalai Lama 
and his activities, especially since the story was front page news in China. 
 
7KH UHVXOWV GR QRW DSSHDU WR EH GULYHQ E\ D ¶UDOO\· HIIHFW WKH PHHWLQJ OHDGs to no more 
authoritarian attitudes, nor increase in patriotism102. One final possibility is that negative views of 
the US increase support for D¶&KLQHVH·YHUVLRQRIGHPRFUDF\UDWKHUWKDQD:HVWHUQFRQFHSWLRQ
of checks and balances ² and therefore people become more likely to believe that China is 
democratic. There is little evidence that this is the case103. Instead of changing their views about 
the definition of democracy, members of the public appeared to become more positive about 
their country overall. Citizens judged the economy, levels of corruption, access to food and 
freedom of speech to all be better after the meeting, suggesting that even on areas unrelated to 
Tibet or human rights, people looked to bolster their positive opinions of their country.  
 
At the same time, the meeting made Chinese citizens more likely to say that they support 
democratic rule. The reasons for this are more difficult to discern. One plausible reason is that 
for citizens to successfully boost their self-esteem by appealing WR WKHLU FRXQWU\·V OHYHO RI
democracy, they also need to believe that democracy is a positive quality for a country to have. 
This should be examined further, but is supported by the finding that the meeting increased 
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support for democracy in those higher in national pride 104 . This suggests that as with 
perceptions, attachment to the nation plays an important role. 
 
Does the ¶'DODL/DPDHIIHFW·persist? This is difficult to dismiss without a long-term longitudinal 
study. However, as shown in figure 1, public attention to incidents like the Dalai Lama meeting 
is fleeting, and the effect may only exist when the incidents are salient. As Zaller·V LQIOXHQWLDO 
(1992) account points out, public opinion is unstable, and determined by whichever issues are 
PRVWVDOLHQWLQSHRSOH·VPLQGV,QWKLVYLHZDV the meeting IDGHVIURPWKHSXEOLF·Vawareness, its 
effects on perceptions of democracy should also fall away105. There are a number of other local, 
nation, and international events that may become more salient and influence WKH&KLQHVHSXEOLF·V
view of their political system, gradually reducing the positive impact of the meeting. As an 
example, figure 5 demonstrates that the Wenzhou train crash quickly replaced the meeting in the 
public eye, right after the five-day period, a crash that may well affect peoplH·V YLHZV RI WKH
competency of their government, and reduce the beneficial impacts of the meeting (not 
something I have space to address in this study). 
 
It is the aggregate effect of foreign pressure that is important. The Dalai Lama meeting is only 
one example of many instances of foreign pressure discussed in the Chinese media. While many 
may not receive the same attention, the level of foreign pressure and its reporting domestically 
means that even if the effects only last as long as pressure is salient, there is quite enough 
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ǯ in July/August 2011. Shaded area denotes 




Democratization in China 
 
Decisions made by world leaders can have significant implications for how Chinese citizens 
consider their domestic circumstances. The literature on authoritarian resilience and public 
beliefs about democracy in China does not examine the role played by these external dynamics, 
placing continued support for the CCP on domestic institutional and economic factors 106 . 
Building on recent calls to better understand the so-FDOOHG ¶VHFRQG-LPDJH UHYHUVHG· in Chinese 
politics107, I show that one important influence on FLWL]HQV·SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHLUSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
comes from the international human rights community. Rather than being unnerved by foreign 
pressure, authorities may benefit from allowing the public to hear information that is critical of 
































































































































Dalai Lama Wenzhou crash
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FRUHLJQ SUHVVXUH RYHU KXPDQ ULJKWV LQ &KLQD PD\ KDYH SHUYHUVHO\ KHOSHG FHPHQW WKH &&3·V
ability to resist public calls for democratization. The literature on the failures of human rights 
pressure on China has put them GRZQWR&KLQD·VJURZLQJSRZHUWRUHVLVWH[WHUQDODFWRUV108, or 
the lack of alignment between foreign efforts and the priorities of the domestic population109. 
This paper suggests that in one-party regimes like China, external pressure may have itself 
affected the priorities of the domestic population, making people less likely to believe that 
reforms need to be made to the political system, and therefore less likely to call for those 
reforms. This demonstrates that the human rights community plays a more complex impact in 
influencing citizen preferences than has otherwise been theorized. Studies that emphasize the 
role international efforts play in promoting liberal and democratic norms are incomplete if they 
GRQRWDGGUHVVKRZWKHVHHIIRUWVDIIHFWFLWL]HQV·SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHLURZQSROLWLFDOV\VWHP 
 
There also needs to be more attention in models of human rights and democracy promotion to 
how authoritarian regimes can use and manipulate international efforts for their own domestic 
purposes. By portraying foreign democracy promotion or meetings with dissidents as deliberate 
attacks on the country, the regime may be able to successfully engender a defensive reaction 
from its citizens and bolster its own support. The CCP has launched an extensive propaganda 
campaign to vilify the Dalai Lama110, and sLQFH/LX;LDRER·V1REHO3HDFH3UL]H LQ VWDWH
media has begun to report more on foreign support for other political prisoners and dissidents in 
China. International condemnation of crackdowns on activists has been featured heavily in 
Chinese media111, and tied closely to a narrative of Western attempts to bring down China112. 
More work is needed to examine how the findings for the Dalai Lama extend to foreign pressure 
over other dissidents and human rights violations, in China and beyond.  
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